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Lawrence: A Labor Union's Right to Recommend Selected Attorneys To Its Inju
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SOLICITATIONLABOR UNIONS
A Labor Union's Right To Recommend Selected Attorneys To
Its Injured Members Is Protected By The First And
Fourteenth Amendments.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 84 Sup. Ot. 1113 (1964).
The Virginia State Bar obtained an injunction against the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in the Chancery Court of
the City of Richmond, Virginia, enjoining it from maintaining
its legal aid plan in Virginia.' The injunction was issued on
the ground that the Brotherhood's activities constituted the
solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of
law in that it resulted in the channeling of all, or substantially
all, the workers' claims to lawyers chosen by the Brotherhood's
Department of Legal Counsel. The Bar relied on the common
2
law, the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association,
and several Virginia statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. 3 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, over objections that the injunction abridged the Brotherhood's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
which guarantee freedom of speech, petition and assembly. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider this constitutional
question in the light of our recent decision in N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button... .4 Held: Judgment and decree vacated and the case
remanded. The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
right of the members, through their Brotherhood, to maintain
and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured
to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers,
who, if accepting employment under the plan, have a like constitutional protection which the state cannot abridge. Brother1. The suit was brought against an attorney designated the Brotherhood's
regional counsel and an investigator employed by the Brotherhood, but they
were not served with process and are not parties.
2. Canons 28, 35, and 47 which have been adopted into the rules of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 171 Va. xviii. The Canons of Ethics
to which the Bar refers prohibit respectively stirring up of litigation, control
or exploitation by a lay agency of professional services of a lawyer, and aiding
the unauthorized practice of law.
3. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 4 §§ 54-42, 54-83.1 (1950). The statutes respectively
set the qualification for the practice of law in the State and provide for injunction against "running, capping, solicitation and maintenance."
4. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,

84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1114 (1964).
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hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84: Sup. Ct. 1113 (1964).

INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND
In the early days of our railroads, railroad work was extremely
dangerous for the railroad employee. It has been noted, for
example, that the odds against a natural death for a brakeman
in 1888 were almost four to one. The average life expectancy
of a switchman in 1893 was only seven years after the beginning
of his employment with the railroad. 5
To combat some of the hazards of railroad work, Congress, in
1893, passed the Safety Appliance Act.6 In 1906 Congress enacted a Federal Employers' Liability Act,7 covering all employees of common carriers by rail engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce. This act was held unconstitutional as exceeding the power of Congress in that it applied to employees who
were themselves engaged in intrastate commerce at the time of
injury.8 However, two years later, in 1908, a second Federal
Employers' Liability Act 9 limited to employees who were themselves in interstate or foreign commerce was held constitutional 0
and is now in effect, with of course, certain amendments. It
must be noted that the most important single group of employees not covered by the workmen's compensation acts are
those of railroads. For more than forty years there has been
discussion of some system similar to the workmen's compensation
acts to cover injuries in the course of railway labor," but in the
main railroad unions have been satisfied with the present statutes, and it is their opposition which has operated chiefly to
12
prevent any change.
Having these federal statutes on the books and the recovery of
damages by an injured railroad employee or his survivors were
5. Id. at 1115.
6. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1958).
7. 34 Stat. 232 (1906).

8. Employers' Liab. Cases, Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463
(1908).
9. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).

10. Second Employers' Liab. Cases, Mondou v. New York, New Haven, &
Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
11. See Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways, 47 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1934); Gelhorn, Federal Workmen's Compensation for TransportationEmployees, 2 LoyoLA L. REv. 138 (1944) ; Pollack,
The Crisis in Work Injury Compensation On and Off the Railroad, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 296 (1953).
12. See Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CoRN. L. Q. 203 (1951).
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two entirely different propositions however. The talented and
skillful legal staffs of the railroads soon made it readily apparent that the legal representation available to the trainmen
was leaving much to be desired. 13 The situation was so bad that
the Government employed the Attorney General's office to file
amicus curiae briefs in the First and Second Employers' Liability Cases. 14 As the U. S. Supreme Court has described the
situation, "Injured workers or their families often fell prey
on the one hand to persuasive claims of adjusters eager to gain a
quick and cheap settlement for their railroad employers, or on
the other to lawyers either not competent to try these lawsuits
against the able and experienced railroad counsel or too willing
to settle a case for a quick dollar."'15
It was in this environment that the trainmen's union known
as the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen conceived and put
into motion a legal aid plan aimed at combatting claim agent
harassment and the securing of competent specialized legal service on a par with the railroads' counsel, at a price below that of
most practitioners.' 6 While the Brotherhood's plan was novel in
its inception, its interest in the railroader was not. The Brotherhood has worked hard to promote and protect the welfare of
trainmen and their families since 1883, being founded for that
specific purpose. The Brotherhood and other railroad unions
were instrumental in the passage of the Safety Appliance Act
17
and the Federal Employers Liability Act.
THE BROTHERHOOD'S LEGAL AID PLAN
1930 - 1959

In 1930, to implement its legal aid plan, the Brotherhood of
:Railroad Trainmen established a Legal Aid Department, which
has since been renamed Department of Legal Counsel. Under the
legal aid plan the United States was divided into sixteen regions.
Within each region, a lawyer or firm was selected by the
Brotherhood to represent trainman plaintiffs or their survivors
13. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,

84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1115 (1964).

14. Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Mondou v. New
York, New Haven, Hartford R.R.. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
15. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1115 (1964).
16. Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 506, 225 P.2d 508, 510

(1950).
17. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1114 (1964).
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in railroad personal injury cases. These lawyers were selected
on the basis of their reputation for honesty and professional
capabilities, on the advice of local lawyers and federal and state
judges.' 8 In addition, the plan provided an investigation service
with regional investigators to find and report facts and to
obtain evidence whenever a claim appeared."" When a trainman
was injured or killed, the plan required a local Brotherhood
officer go to him or to his widow or children and advise them
not to settle the claim without first counsulting a lawyer. 20 This
local officer would tell the claimant that the best counsel to consult was the counsel selected by the Brotherhood for that area. 2 1
In fact, the constitution of the Brotherhood prescribed that each
local lodge should appoint someone to fill out an accident report
and to advise the claimant that the regional counsel would give
legal advice without charge. 22 This appointed advisor usually
made it a practice to carry the necessary contract for the retention of the regional counsel when he contacted the claimant,
as did the investigators employed by the Brotherhood. 23 While
it was not compulsory for the trainman or his surviving family
to follow the Brotherhood's advice as to counsel, strong and continuous recommendations were made. 24 In some instances, if the
claimant did not agree to sign the contract, he and his spouse
were taken on an expense-free trip to the regional counsel's
office by the investigator. If the claimant was a widow, the
investigator's wife accompanied her. In either event, and regardless of the outcome of the trip, the regional counsel paid
the expenses of the trip for the claimant and the investigator. 23
At times, the investigator received a gratuity from the regional
counsel for bringing in a case, often $100 to $150.20 In addition
to these personal contacts, persistent recommendations were
made to Brotherhood members not to settle a claim without con18. Id. at 1115.

19. Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 506, 225 P.2d 508, 511
(1950).
20. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1115 (1964).
21. Ibid.

22. it re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 IlU.2d 391, 392, 150 N.E.2d 163,
165 (1958).
23. Id. at 393, 150 N.E.2d at 166.

24. Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 506, 225 P.2d 508, 511
(1950).

25. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 I1l.2d 391, 392, 150 N.E.2d 163,

166 (1958).
26. Ibid.
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sulting an attorney, preferably the
regional counsel, in various
27
journals, circulars, and meetings.
The arrangement between the Brotherhood and its regional
counsel required the regional counsel to advance all necessary
costs of court, fees for expert witnesses, expenses of medical examinations, and all similar expenses for the conduct of the litiga28
tion for the claimant.
Over the years the original retention procedure was modified
twice. The original plan in 1930 called for the claimant to
execute a single contract directly with the regional counsel on
forms approved by the Legal Aid Department, based on a 20
per cent contingent fee and stipulating that the attorney must
turn over one-fourth of the fee obtained to the Brotherhood for
29
the maintenance of the Legal Aid Department.
As a result of the first modification to the original plan the
claimant was required to execute two contracts; one with the
regional counsel for a fee of 19 per cent of the net settlement,
and the other with the Brotherhood for 6 per cent of the net
settlement as a charge for investigating services.30
The second modification of the fee procedure was put into
effect in 1946 and allowed the attorney to handle the case under
a single fee retention contract for 25 per cent of the recovery.
Under this arrangement, the attorney agreed to pay the investigators from the Brotherhood's Legal Aid Department on a
guantum reruit basis. 31 In addition, the expenses of the Legal
Aid Department were to be pro-rated among the sixteen regional
counsels on the basis of their gross fees. 32 Expenses of the Legal
Aid Department included maintaining a staff of five administrative personnel, a research analyst, and a number of regional
investigators. Another expense of the Legal Aid Department
was the cost for "floor time" at Brotherhood conventions.3
Thus, the regional counsels paid for the work done for them
by regional investigators, the overall expenses of maintaining
the Legal Aid Department, and the Legal Aid Department's
representation at conventions.
27. Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 506, 225 P.2d 508, 511

(1950).
23.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 392, 150 N.E.2d 163,

165 (1958).

33. Ibid.
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There can be no doubt but that the tide has turned in favor
of the railroad worker in his claims against the railroads. Plaintiffs now recover in practically all of the cases, and verdicts for
the most part have been substantial. 34 This result is due perhaps,
in great measure, to favorable interpretation of the Federal
Employers Liability Act by the United States Supreme Court ;85
but, the legal aid plan of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
can undoubtedly be given some of the credit.
SOLICITATION, ADVERTISING, AND LEGAL ETHICS
The proscription of advertising and solicitation by lawyers
has its roots in the training received by the young Americans
who travelled to England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to become barristers. The atmosphere prevailing in
England at that time was that the practice of law was a public
service and not a means by which to earn an income. Because
the barristers of that day did not practice for pecuniary gain,
there was no reason for them to compete with one another for
clients.3 6 Thus, the only spirit of competition was that between
opposing counsel in a given case. 37 Since only the sons of wealthy

families studied law, they too could well afford to entertain
such a lofty principle. This philosophy, combined with the
extremely close comradeship the students enjoyed at the Inns of
the English Courts, materially contributed to this non-competitive attitude which was brought back to this country by the
returning students.38 As a result, this ancient view was firmly
entrenched in our legal system long before the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association expressly approved the prohibitions against advertising and solicitation. 9
There are several dominant reasons advanced in support of the
prohibition of advertising and solicitation. First, there is the
theory that lawyers would actively engage in "stirring up
34. Legal Ethics in F.E.L.A. Litigation, 25 TENN. L. Ray. 155, 157 (1958).
Volume 25 of the Tenn. L. Rev. (Winter Issue 1958) contains an abundance
of excellent material on FELA compiled during the Eighteenth Annual Law
Institute of the University of Tenn. College of Law and the Knoxville Bar
Ass'n held at Knoxville in 1957.
35. See Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 160 (1953).

36.

DRINKER, LEGAL

ETHics 210-11 (1953).

37. Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J.

(1958).

554

38. DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 210.
39. E.g., People v. Taylor, 32 Colo. 250, 75 Pac. 914 (1904); People v.
MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 32 Pac. 280 (1893).
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litigation".40 This could be particularly41dangerous to the public
42
welfare in the area of domestic relations and probate matters.
Second, there is the danger of fraudulent claims being instigated
43
by unscrupulous lawyers seeking out unscrupulous clients.
Third, there is a danger of corruption of public officials such
as policemen, physicians, or employees of hospitals or newspapers, who, for pay, would perhaps give more attention to
44
the demands of the soliciting lawyer than to their own jobs.
Fourth, it is suggested that solicitation and advertising would
45
It is reasoned
be detrimental to the entire legal profession.
that the profession would lose its traditional dignity and hardearned respect and reputation. 46 It is not unreasonable to assume the public would quickly lose respect for the profession if it
felt lawyers were primarily seeking financial gain rather than
the achievement of justice. Logically enough, disrespect for
47
the entire legal process and orderly government could follow.
A further detriment might be the concentration of business in
the hands of a relatively small number of well-advertised lawyers
or firms. 48 Fifth, it is feared that harm could come to the client
by attorneys "overreaching", "overcharging", and "underrepresenting.1 40 The idea of overreaching is that solicitation could
prevent free choice to an unknowledgeable client or one that is
mentally unprepared to engage the services of a lawyer, such as
an injured person just admitted to a hospital, or members of a
bereaved family still suffering from the shock of losing a loved
one.5" Overcharging could result from the soliciting and adver40. A CriticalAnalysis of Rules Against Solicitation By Lawyers, 25 U. CHI.

L. REv. 674 (1958) [Hereinafter cited as Critical Analysis]. But see POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CommoN LAW 134 (1921) : "It will not do to say to the
population of modern cities that the practical cutting off of all petty litigation,
by which theoretically the rights of the average man are to be maintained, is a
In truth, the idea
good thing because litigation ought to be discouraged ....
that litigation is to be discouraged, proper enough, in so far as it refers to
amicable adjustment of what ought to be adjusted, has its roots chiefly in the
obvious futility of litigation under the conditions of procedure which have been
obtained in the immediate past . . . . Moreover, there is danger that in discouraging litigation we encourage wrongdoing, and it requires very little experience in the legal aid societies in any of our cities to teach us that we have
been doing that very thing." (Emphasis added.)
41. For cases encouraging divorce litigation see 9 A.L.R. 1500 (1920).
42. Cases on "heir hunting" are collected in 171 A.L.R. 351 (1947).
43. Critical Analysis 678.
44. Id. at 680.
45. Id. at 681.
46. See, e.g., Mayer v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 71, 39 P.2d 206 (1934).
47. Critical Analysis 681.
48. Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. Rv. 677, 684
(1954).
49. Critical Analysis 682.
50. Critical Analysis 683.
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tising lawyer's expenses in maintaining an adequate solicitation
network.5 ' Underrepresentation is predicated on the presumption
that it might be more profitable for professional "ambulance
chasers" to operate on a high volume low return basis than to
52
consider the best interests of each client.
For each of the arguments in support of the prohibition of
solicitation and advertising there are counter-arguments and
counter-theories equally potent and strong enough to make one
ponder whether absolute proscription of solicitation is either
wise or necessary. It has been suggested, for example, that advertising and solicitation should be permitted because the right to
practice a profession includes the right to use all lawful means
to justify and promote success; that today the vast majority of
lawyers practice law to earn their livelihood; and that people
with just claims may lose their rights by defaulting through
ignorance or as a result of adjusters who secure premature
53
releases.
What the courts, bar associations, and various committees on
ethics have found to be violative of the various rules of court
and statutes prohibiting advertising and solicitation ranges
from the obvious to the abstruse, and the spectrum is wide and
controversial.5 4 For example, in its Opinion 284, the American
Bar Association Committee on Ethics disapproved the listing of
a lawyer's name with distinctive type in the alphabetical section
of a telephone directory.5 5 This opinion reversed a previous
opinion that recognized alphabetical sections of a telephone
directory are not designed to enable readers to select a lawyer,
but are used by one to find the lawyer whom he had already
chosen.56 Another example, this one of a less debatable nature,
is found in a recently decided New York case where the respondent, an attorney, was censured by the court for violating Canon
27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association adopted by the New York State Bar Association
51. Ibid.

52. Luther, supra note 37, at 555.

53. Id. at 554; Critical Analysis 674-85; See Hicxs, ORGANIZATION AND
261-269 (1932).
supra note 36, at 210-73; Annot. 39 A.L.R.2d
1055 (1955) where cases involving advertising have been collected; Annot. 69
A.L.R.2d 859 (1959) where cases involving solicitation of personal injury
ETHICS op BENCH AND BAR
54. See DRINKER, op. cit.

actions have been collected; Annot. supra note 41, at 1500; Annot. .supra note

42, at 351.
55. DRINKER,
56. Ibid.

op. cit.

supra note 36 at 246.
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in 1909.12' The respondent's violation was the maintenance of a
sign approximately 16 feet long and 2 feet high, bearing the
legend "LAW OFFICE" in block letters and his name in
script. The sign, placed over the street level store in which he
maintained his law office, was illuminated at night by means
of two white neon bars-one along the top and the other along
the bottom. In addition, the store front, which consisted of two
large plate glass windows of the retail store variety, contained
two neon tubing signs-one in red and one in green-spelling
out "LAW OFFICE" and the respondent's name respectively.
The penalty for soliciting legal business has been as severe
as disbarment,5" and the same has been true for violating the
ethical standards of the law profession by advertising. 59 The
courts generally agree that the purpose of a disbarment proceeding is not to punish the attorney but rather to protect the
court itself0 0 and to relieve the public of a member of the legal
profession who is unfit to serve as such because of his poor
professional character. 1
One might logically question exactly where the line is drawn
or whether indirect solicitation by practicing lawyers, for
example, is undesirable. To illustrate, it is a well known fact
that numerous lawyers are active participants in politics at all
levels; then too, many lawyers make speeches at various meetings, and many are engaged in civic work. Likewise, many
lawyers belong to social clubs where potential clients are met.
Should these activities and associations also be frowned upon
and curtailed as falling within the scope of culpable solicitation?
In placing his name before the public as being active in political,
religious, fraternal and other affairs, the lawyer is indirectly
soliciting, 2 It appears that the more crude and direct forms of
solicitation have been restrained, while the more indirect and
05
subtle methods have not.
57. It re Duffy, 19 App. Div.2d 177, 242 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1963).

58. E.g., State ex rel. Sorensen v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340, 255 N.W. 32
(1934) ; In re Welch, 156 App. Div. 470, 141 N.Y.S. 381 (1931).
59. E.g., Mayer v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 71, 39 P.2d 206 (1934); In re
Schwarz, 195 App. Div. 194, 186 N.Y.S. 535 (1921).
60. See Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882); State v. Jennings, 161
S.C. 263, 266, 159 S.E. 627, 629 (1931); State v. Holding, 1 McCord 379,
381 (S.C. 1821).
61. See In re Sacher, 206 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1953) ; State v. Jennings .supra
note 60 at 266, 159 S.E. at 629; State v. Holding, supra note 60 at 381.
62. Luther, supra note 37, at 554.

63. Ibid.
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Further, one might also reflect upon the significance of certain inroads that apparently have been made in the traditional
prohibitive theory on solicitation and advertising. For example,
publicity and advertising used by banks, trust companies and tax
experts has to some degree given laymen an advantage in areas
in which they share interests with the lawyer.0 4 This in turn
has been responsible for the relaxation of the no-advertising
rule to the extent of sanctioning such plans of group advertising
as bar association advertising and the lawyers referral plan.05
Do these inconsistencies and trends indicate that it is time
for a re-evaluation of the rules prohibiting all advertising and
solicitation? Certainly this writer is not suggesting that the
rules be so relaxed that the kind of problem presented by "ambulance chasing", which was so serious in the 1920's, be given
fertile ground in which to blossom again. 66 But should not a
more practical and realistic approach be taken towards solicitation and advertising by bringing the rules more in line with the
present needs of the practicing attorney and the public?7
APPLICABLE SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES
AND RULES OF COURT
Pertinent provisions of the Code of Laws of South Carolina
(1962) for the purposes of this comment are :68
§ 56-96. Inherent power of Supreme Court to regulate
practice of law; §§ 56-96 to 56-100 cumulative.-The inherent power of the Supreme Court with respect to regulating the practice of law, determining the qualifications
for admission to the bar and discipling, suspending and
disbarring attorneys at law is hereby recognized and de64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. For an excellent account of the problem of "ambulance chasing" see
Nationwide War on "Ambulance Chasers", 14 A.B.A.J. 561 (1928).

67. For highly enlightening material on legal ethics to include solicitation and
advertising see 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 375 (1954). This is a symposium edition
devoted entirely to a reproduction of the proceeding of a nationally attended
legal ethics institute held at the University of Florida. Some scholars have
argued for relaxation in the application of the canons of ethics to some group
programs. See, e.g., Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 375,
383, (1954) ; Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower-Income Group, 29 ORE.
L. REv. 20, 29-30 (1949). See also Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and
Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD. 104 (1938).
68. It is clear that statutes prohibiting solicitation of employment, either
personally or through others, have been upheld as constitutional. The cases
have been collected in Annot. 53 A.L.R. 279 (1928). See, e.g., People v.
Meola, 193 App. Div. 487, 184 N.Y.S. 353 (1920).
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§§ 56-96
clared. The authority conferred on that court in 69
thereto.
cumulative
as
deemed
be
shall
to 56-100
§ 56-97. Supreme Court may promulgate rules and regulations concerning practice of law.-The Supreme Court
may from time to time prescribe, adopt, promulgate and
amend such rules and regulations as it may deem proper
(a) defining and regulating the practice of law, (b) determining the qualifications and requirements for admission
to the practice of law, (c) prescribing a code of ethics
governing the professional conduct of attorneys at law and
(d) prescribing the procedure for disciplining, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law.
§ 56-142. Practice of law by corporations and voluntary
associations.-It shall be unlawful for any corporation or
voluntary association... (c) to hold itself out to the public
as being entitled to practice law or render or furnish legal
services or advice or to furnish attorneys or counsel or render legal services of any dnd in actions or proceedings of
any nature or in any other way or manner, .... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished
in the discretion of the court.
§ 56-145. Soliciting business illegal.-It shall be unlawful for any person or his agent, employee or anyone acting
on his behalf to solicit or procure through solicitation, either
directly or indirectly, legal business or to solicit or procure
through solicitation a retainer, written or oral, or any agreement authorizing an attorney to perform or render legal
services. Any person violating any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall
be punished in the discretion of the court.
§ 56-146. Fees not to be split with laymen.-It shall be
unlawful for any person, partnership, corporation or association to divide with or receive from, or to agree to divide
with or receive from, any attorney at law or group of attorneys at law, whether practicing in this state or elsewhere,
69. For cases recognizing the supreme court's inherent power to regulate
the practice of law in South Carolina see In re Jacobson, 240 S.C. 436, 448,

126 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1962); Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 334, 117 S.E.2d
300, 309 (1960) ; State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 265, 272, 159 S.E. 627, 628,

631 (1931) ; Watson v. Citizens' Say. Bank, 5 S.C. 159, 177 (1873) ; State v.
Holding, 1 McCord 379, 380 (S.C. 1821).
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either before or after action brought, any portion of any fee
or compensation charged or received by such attorney at law
or any valuable consideration or reward as an inducement
for placing or in consideration for having placed in the
hands of such attorneys at law, or in the hands or another
person a claim or demand of any kind for the purpose of
collecting such claim or bringing action thereon or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy for
the recovery thereof. But this section does not apply to an
agreement between attorneys and counsellors at law to
divide between themselves the compensation to be received.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
punished in the discretion of the court.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina adopted pursuant to §§ 56-96 to 56-99, S.C. Code
1962, for the purposes of this comment are:
Rule 32. Standards of professional conduct for attorneys.
The present Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association are hereby adopted and established as the
standards of professional conduct for all attorneys heretofore and hereafter admitted to practice in the Courts of
South Carolina.
Rule 33. Canons of professional ethics. Adopted by the
American Bar Association as amended to May 1956.70
27. Advertising, direct or indirect. It is unprofessional
to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect
advertisements for professional employment . . . offend

the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and
are reprehensible; ....
28. Stirring up litigation, directly or through agents.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
70. The Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Ass'n
were adopted as a rule by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1956.
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indictable at common law. It is disreputable . to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or
runners for like purposes, ....
34. Division of fees. No division of fees for legal ser-

vices is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a
division of service or responsibility.
35. Intermediaries. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility should
be direct to the client ....

A lawyer may accept employ-

ment from any organization, such as an association, club
or trade organization, to render legal services in any
matter in which the organization as an entity is interested
but this employment should not include the rendering of
legal services to the members of such an organization in
respect to their individual affairs.
47. Aiding the unauthorized practice of law. No lawyer
shall permit his professional services, or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized
practice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.
THE LEADING CASES
71

In re O'Neil
(1933)-The respondent, an attorney, was
regional counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
and had functioned in accordance with the Brotherhood's legal
aid plan. The respondent's conduct was found to be unprofessional and violative of Canon 28 of the Canons of Ethics of
the New York State Bar Association dealing with stirring up
litigation, directly or through agents, and he was censured. As
regional counsel the respondent's contract of retainer had provided for a contingent fee of 20 per cent, one-quarter of which
71. 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
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the respondent paid to the Brotherhood for the maintenance of
its Legal Aid Bureau. The court observed that during the proceeding the Brotherhood's fee plan had been altered to provide
for two contracts of employment to be procured by the regional
counsel-one for 15 per cent to secure his fee and the other
whereby the client employs the Legal Aid Department of the
Brotherhood to investigate the claim for 5 per cent of the net
settlement. The court said that it could see no difference in
principle between the two contractual arrangements, and added
that any cases the respondent had on the calendar of the court,
in which he was retained under such contracts, would not be
permitted to proceed until he specifically demonstrated that he
had been retained under a new agreement as to which there had
been no interest, express or implied, direct or indirect, upon his
part, in the payment by his client of any sum to the Brotherhood.
The necessity for such independence of function, the court
pointed out, was clearly set forth in Canon 35 of the Code of
Ethics prohibiting intermediaries and requiring personal and
72
direct relationship between lawyer and client.
Hildebrand v. State Bar of California7 (1941)-This was a
proceeding by Hildebrand, an attorney, for a review of a recommendation made by the Board of Bar Governors that he be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. The petitioner
was charged with four counts of violating the Bar's rules concerning solicitation. The charge on the fourth count grew out
of his position as regional counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The evidence showed a local Brotherhood officer had informed a trainman who had lost an eye in a railroad accident of the Brotherhood's Legal Aid Department and
discussed with him the petitioner's role as regional counsel. The
local official thereafter wrote the petitioner requesting him to
communicate with the injured party. The petitioner called on
72. Prior to this case, in Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932),
a regional counsel for the Brotherhood sought to assert a lien for professional
services rendered pursuant to the Brotherhood's legal aid plan. The Illinois
court upheld the contract, praising the scheme as being in the public interest.
The court said: "After a careful consideration of all the facts we are satisfied
that these contentions and arguments are without merit, and we feel impelled
to say that the assertion that the Brotherhood, through its legal aid department
is akin to an ambulance chaser and the petitioner was a beneficiary of an
unethical and unlawful system of obtaining clients, is unworthy of the able
lawyers who made it." Another case decided about the same time as lit re
O'Neill and with a like result is In re Committee on Rule 28, 15 Ohio Law
Abs. 106 (1933).
73. 18 Cal2d 816, 117 P.2d 860 (1941).
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the injured party on two occasions, once at a hospital and once
at his home two months later. During the latter visit the petitioner exhibited some photostatic copies of bank checks indicating past amounts of recoveries and other such data. At that
time, the petitioner also agreed to lend the injured man a sum
of money monthly to meet his living expenses pending the outcome of the case. The petitioner and the railroader entered into
an agreement whereby the latter was to employ the petitioner,
the petitioner's compensation to be based on the amount which
he could obtain in excess of that theretofore offered him in
settlement ($5,500.00). Petitioner obtained a settlement of
$8,500.00, whereupon the injured party, to avoid paying the
petitioner's fee, lodged a complaint against the petitioner with
the Bar Association. The court dismissed the fourth charge
(as well as the other three) on the ground that the testimony
by the injured railroadman was colored by self-interest and
animosity. The court observed that such charges must be sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty, and
any doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
It must be noted that the court did not go into the basic plan
of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, dealing only with
the facts of this particular case.
Hildebrand v. State Bar of California74 (1950)-The petitioners in this proceeding were regional counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen who had operated in accord with
the Brotherhood's legal aid plan. The Board of Governors of
the State Bar had recommended that they be disciplined (one
to be suspended for four months and the other two to be publicly
reproved) for violating rules of the Bar prohibiting solicitation
of professional employment. This proceeding was an appeal
from the Board of Governor's recommendation. The court concluded that the petitioners' contractual relationship with the
Brotherhood as a part of the basic service plan of the Legal Aid
Department was overall solicitation of legal employment contrary to established standards. The petitioners argued that their

case was distinguished from the O'Neill case in that their fee
procedure (admitted by the petitioners as having been adopted
as a result of the O'Neill decision) called for only one contract,
for 19 per cent of the net settlement, to be executed by them
and that one with the client. The other contract, for 6 per cent
74. 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
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of the net recovery, was presented to the client by a representative of the Brotherhood. The court, however, decided that the
contracts were dependent one upon the other and constituted one
overall transaction involving the compensation between regional
counsel and the Brotherhood as a fee-splitting device. It must
be noted that the court did not rule on the petitioners' further
claim that the fee-splitting criticism was no longer a factor
since it had been superseded by a new single contract arrangement for a 25 per cent contingent fee running wholly in favor
of the attorney, who paid therefrom the Brotherhood's investigators on a quantum meruit basis, on the ground that this was
not the practice at the time of the misconduct. The court did
comment, however, that under either fee arrangement the general channeling of legal work continued as a prevailing feature
in the Brotherhood's undertaking with the petitioners. The court
held that the petitioners' participation in the Brotherhood's plan
was improper but, because of the absence of a prior decision in
the court's jurisdiction, the ends of justice could best be served
without disciplinary action, their holding to serve prospectively
as a guide.
There were two dissenting opinions written, both of which
strongly expressed the view that the petitioners were not guilty
of illegal solicitation of employment or fee-splitting. The dissenting opinions were based on several considerations, one of
which was the overall worthiness of the Brotherhood's legal
aid plan to assist its members in obtaining competent counsel
at reduced fees. It was noted that the essential objectives of
the plan was not to obtain clients for an attorney but to assist
the members of the Brotherhood in a matter of vital concern to
them, that the Brotherhood is merely a group of persons interested in protecting themselves in the event of injury and it
is merely incidental that in so doing a benefit results to the
attorney. The dissenting justices also made reference to several
activities they considered analogous to the petitioners' activities;
for example, the liability insurance field where the insurer
agrees to defend the insured in any action arising out of a
policy and retains control over the litigation, including the
employment of an attorney; legal aid bureaus for indigent persons which urge the use of their free services; various associations such as those of contractors, banks, and merchants who
employ attorneys to represent them and furnish advice to members on matters of general and common interest and even pay
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a portion or all the expenses incident to handling a case of common interest; medical aid plans where doctors have joined in a
plan to give medical care at a fixed amount to solicited members.
The dissenting justices also disagreed with the majority on the
fee-splitting issue, stating that to consider the arrangement as
such was contrary to the facts in that the contract for the 6 per
cent investigation fee ran straight to the Brotherhood and the
attorney had nothing to do with it. It was noted that the contractual arrangement was no different than if each member
would execute a contract with the Brotherhood that in the event
he used the services of the Legal Aid Department at any time
in the future he would pay therefor 6 per cent of his recovery,
that in either case the relation between that charge and the
attorney's fees for his services are wholly independent. Justice
Carter expressed his overall sentiments thus:
Given the primary duty of the legal profession to
serve the public, the rules it establishes to govern its
professional ethics must be directed at the performance
of that duty. Canons of Ethics that would operate
to deny to the railroad employees the effective legal
assistance they need can be justified only if such a denial
is necessary to suppress professional conduct that in
other cases would be injurious to the effective discharge
of the profession's duties to the public.
In support of the Brotherhood's plan and modus operandi,
Justice Traynor was of the opinion that it neither lowered the
dignity of the legal profession, nor led railroad employees to incompetent counsel, nor interfered with the personal requirements
of the attorney-client relationship, nor deprived the Brotherhood
members of the right to reject the regional counsel and retain
another attorney, nor posed a danger that the attorney would be
faced with conflicting allegiances, because there was no conflict
in interests between the Brotherhood and its members.
Doughty v. Gills75 (1952) -The
defendants, two investigators for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, were
enjoined by the court from referring or sending injured
railroad workers or their survivors to the regional counsel for
the purpose of employing the regional counsel to handle their
claims in accordance with the Brotherhood's legal aid plan. The
court concluded that this constituted solicitation and the defend75. 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
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ants' actions in doing so resulted in aiding and abetting the
illegal practice of law. The court's holding was specifically
limited to the activities of the two defendants, stating that since
neither the Brotherhood nor the regional counsel were parties
in the action they were not undertaking to rule on their activities per se.
In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen"h (1958)-This was
a motion on behalf of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
for a declaratory judgment requesting a ruling that the conduct
of the Brotherhood and the lawyers who serve as regional counsel was neither illegal nor unprofessional. The motion disclosed
that disciplinary proceedings against a regional counsel and
his associates were pending. The fee arrangement considered in
this case provided for regional counsel charging a fee of 25
per cent of the amount recovered in each case, whether recovery
was by settlement or by judgment. The arrangement further
provided that regional counsel would advance for the claimant
all court costs, investigation costs, costs of doctor's examinations,
and share with the other regional counsels the total cost of operating the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood. The
court declared the arrangement between the Brotherhood and
the attorneys serving as regional counsel illegal and unprofessional in light of a statute which provided, "It shall be unlawful
for any person not an attorney at law to solicit for money, fee,
commission, or other remuneration directly or indirectly in any
manner whatsoever, and demand or claim for personal injuries
or for death for the purpose of having an action brought thereon, or for the purpose of settling the same."
In giving its guidance as to what the Brotherhood might
properly do to achieve its legitimate objectives without tearing
down the standards of the legal profession the court outlined
the following points: (1) The Brotherhood could maintain a
staff to investigate injuries to its members. (2) The Brotherhood could make reports of investigations available to claimants.
(3) The Brotherhood's legal aid staff could be financed directly
by the members of the Brotherhood. (4) The Brotherhood
could make known to its members, generally and also individually, as claimants, the advisability of obtaining legal advice before
making a settlement as well as the names of attorneys who in
its opinion possess the capacity to handle such claims success76. 13 IIl2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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fully. (5) Employees of the Brotherhood could not carry contracts for the employment of any lawyer or photostats of settlement checks received for claimants in the past. (6) No financial
connection of any kind between the Brotherhood and any lawyer
would be permissible. (7) No lawyer could properly pay any
amount to the Brotherhood or any of its departiments, officers,
or members as compensation, reimbursement of expenses or
gratuity in connection with the procurement of a case. (8) The
Brotherhood could not fix the fees to be charged for legal services to its members.
On the strength of a 1932 decision in a lower appellate court 77
which strongly approved the Brotherhood's practices on the
basis of public policy, this court concluded its decision by recommending the pending disciplinary action against the regional
counsel and his associates be dropped, and the Brotherhood was
given until July 1, 1959, to reorganize its legal aid program in
compliance with their guidelines.78
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In analyzing the instant case, it is important to note that the
Court was careful to point out the Brotherhood was objecting
only to the provisions of the decree which enjoined it

".

.

. from

holding out lawyers selected by it as the only approved lawyers
to aid the members or their families; ...

or in any other manner

soliciting or encouraging such legal employment of the selected
lawyers; . . . and from doing any act or combination of acts,

and from formulating and putting into practice any plan, pattern or design, the result of which is to channel legal employment
to any particular lawyer or group of lawyers .... ,,79 Significant
also, in this respect, is the Court's statement in footnote 9:80
Certain other provisions of the decree enjoined the Brotherhood from sharing counsel fees with lawyers whom it
77. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).

78. In 1956, two years prior to this decision, three cases involving the
Brotherhood's legal aid plan were decided: in Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v.
Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956) the court disapproved of the Brotherhood's plan as contrary to legal ethics (dictum) ; the court likewise disapproved
of the Brotherhood's plan in the case of In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d 357, 140
N.E.2d 825 (1956), but because of lack of competent evidence and other
factors the defendant, a regional counsel, was discharged. The Brotherhood's
plan was again disapproved in Opendack v. McDonald, No. 144823, Wash.

Super Ct., (1956).

79. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar,

84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1115, 1116 (1964).
80. Id. at 1116.
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recommended and from countenancing the sharing of fees
by its regional investigators. The Brotherhood denies that
it has engaged in such practices since 1959, in compliance
with a decree of the Supreme Court of Illinois. See In re
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen ....
Since the Brotherhood is not objecting to the other provisions of the decree
except insofar as they might later be construed as barring
the Brotherhood from helping injured workers or their
families by recommending that they not settle without a
lawyer and by recommending certain lawyers selected by
the Brotherhood, it is only to that extent that we pass upon
the validity of the other provisions. Because of our disposition of the case, we do not consider the Brotherhood's
claim that the findings of the court [on sharing of fees]
were not supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, it is very clear the Court's decision did not include consideration of the fee sharing issue that was decided adversely
to the Brotherhood in the two courts below-just as other courts
who previously considered the union plan had decided the issue. 8 '
Left unanswered by the Court is the question of what importance
a financial arrangement between the regional counsel and the
Brotherhood would have on the legality of the overall plan. A.
clue to the Court's feeling on the union-lawyer relationship, and
the rights pertaining thereto can be found in this observation
in the instant case: "It is interesting to note that in Great
Britain unions do not simply recommend lawyers to members in
need of advice; they retain counsel, paid by the union, to represent members in personal lawsuits, a practice similar to that
which we upheld in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,

....

3)82

81. See, e.g., In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 IlI.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d
163 (1958). For excellent material on the Supreme Court and the right of

free speech and press see Annot. 93 L.Ed. 1151 (1948); Annot. 2 L.Ed.2d

1706 (1957).
82. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,

84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1117 (1964). As this Court is apparently suggesting, proponents of the Brotherhood program have urged that since similar practices
are condoned in England they should not be objectionable in this country.
However, two significant differences exist in the British legal profession. First,
the contingent fee is forbidden. Second, the legal profession in England is

partially socialized. See

CHEATHAM, CASES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION

517

(2d Ed. 1955). The interposition of the government into the attorney-client
relationship and the nonexistence of the contingent fee may suggest the reason
for British leniency toward such programs. See also Turrentine, supra note
67, at 30; Weihofen, "Practice of law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations; A

Social Utility, 2 U. OF CH1. L. REv. 119 (1934). One outstanding writer in
the area of legal ethics apparently favors the British system of labor unions
retaining legal counsel on a permanent basis to advise their members. See
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Considering the Supreme Court's recent decision in the
Button8 case, which thwarted Virginia's attempt to restrain
certain NAACP activities on the ground that they constituted
solicitation of legal business, it is not at all surprising that the
Brotherhood elected to put its oft-litigated legal aid plan to
the ultimate test, this time on constitutional grounds to secure
the ultimate stamp of legality on a plan previously weakened
by state courts on the basis of solicitation There can be no doubt
but that the Brotherhood correctly interpreted the full meaning
and implications of the Court's stand in the Button decision. In
the instant case, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Black said :4
Only last term we had occasion to consider an earlier
attempt by Virginia to enjoin the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People from advising prospective litigants to seek the assistance of particular attorneys.
In fact, in that case, unlike this one, the attorneys were
actually employed by the association which recommended
them, and recommendations were made even to nonmembers
....We held that "although the petitioner has amply shown

that its activities fall within the First Amendment's protections, the State failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from
the petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed." In the present case the
State again has failed to show any appreciable public in167 (1953): "The whole modern tendency is in favor
of such arrangements, including particularly employer and cooperative health
services, the principles of which, if applied to legal services, would materially
lower and spread the total cost to the lower income groups. The real argument against their approval by the bar is believed to be loss of income to the
lawyers and concentration of service in hands of fewer lawyers. These features
do not commend the profession to the public." Courts have repeatedly refused
to sanction programs calling for the interposition of even a non-profit intermediary into the attorney-client relationship however. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Il: 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
In this country courts have found objectionable the possibility that close ties
between the lay organization and the lawyer may dissipate the degree of personal responsibility felt toward the individual client. Thus, an automobile club
may not furnish a lawyer to represent its members: American Auto. Ass'n v.
Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940). A union might, however, enter the
insurance business, since then its own money would be at stake and it would
be litigating in its own behalf. See Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by
Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YALE L. J. 69, 93 (1931).
83. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For an excellent review
of this case see 15 S.C.L.R. 845 (1963).
84. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1117 (1964).
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
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terest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its
plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers. The Brotherhood's activities fall just as
clearly within the protection of the First Amendment. And
the Constitution protects the associational rights of the
members of the union precisely as it does those of the
NAACP.
From these words it seems clear that the Court is recognizing
the fact that the right of speech under the First Amenchnent is
not absolute. One has merely to reflect on the laws relating
to slander, libel, perjury, false advertising, obscenity and other
such laws to satisfy this premise.8 5 But, the Court adds, in order
to qualify a person's right to speak, a substantial danger to the
public interest must be shown. The specific question that remains is whether the evils that surround fee splitting by an
attorney, if in fact this was a current practice under the Brotherhood's legal aid plan, would have been sufficient danger to the
public interest to justify limiting the union members' right
of speech for a superior state interest.8 0 The Court seems to make
clear that if the state had shown an appreciable danger to the
public by the Brotherhood's activities, the Brotherhood would
not have had the unlimited protection of the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, were of
the opinion that substantial evil could result from upholding
the Brotherhood's plan-enough to "bring disrepute to the legal
profession" and to "encourage further departures from the high
standards set by canons of ethics as well as by state regulatory
procedures and . . .be a green light to other groups who for

years have attempted to engage in similar practices. '87
The Brotherhood's policy of advising injured members to
obtain legal advice and of recommending its regional counsel was
88
obviously not considered to be solicitation.
85. See 15 S.C.L.R. 845, 848 (1963).

86. Courts have found fee splitting extremely obnoxious. Normally fee
splitting is accompanied by other abuses. E.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Agee,
175 Ohio St. 443, 196 N.E.2d 98 (1964) where the respondent, an attorney, was
indefinitely suspended for splitting fees with a layman who funneled clients
covered under workmen's compensation to him. The respondent was also found
guilty of violating other provisions of the code of ethics that forbid the use of
intermediaries, the solicitation of business through touters, and the stirring
up of litigation through agents.
87. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1119, 1120 (1964).
88. Id. at 1117.
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Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization of the legal profession . .

.

. It is not "ambulance

chasing." The railroad workers, by recommending competent lawyers to each other, obviously are not themselves
engaging in the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers
whom they select parties to any soliciting of business.
The two dissenting Justices, however, were of the opinion that
the Brotherhood's activities did constitute solicitation and was
a "patent violation of the cardinal ethics of our profession." 89
The dissenting opinion also distinguished Button from the instant case on the ground that the former involved the securing
of constitutionally protected civil rights through court action,
while the instant case involved personal injury litigation.9 0
The Court plainly recognized that a state has broad powers
to regulate the practice of law within its borders, but said in
so doing a state "cannot ignore the rights of individuals secured
by the Constitution."'1
In this writer's opinion, the Supreme Court, in handing down
the instant decision and the Button decision, has struck a mighty
blow at the traditional and perhaps too inflexible concepts of
solicitation, and to the extent a state can control and regulate it.
The Court's decision, absent the financial agreement issues, appears to be in accord with the minority views in the 1950 Hildebrand92 case, and the 1958 In re Brotherhood 3 Illinois opinion.
As stated above, exactly what significance the standard financial
arrangements used by the Brotherhood in the past would have
had on the Court's decision is unclear. Under the 1950 Hildebrand 4 minority view no effect-under the 1958 Illinois In re
Brotherhood 5 view the same arrangement would have been enjoined. However, from a careful analysis of the Court's decisions in this and the Button case, as well as a careful study of
all the arguments pro and con reflected in other court rulings on
89. Id. at 1118. Accord, It re Fisch, 269 App. Div. 74, 54 N.Y.S.2d 126
(1945) ; In re Axtell, 229 App. Div. 323, 242 N.Y.S. 18 (1930). Both of these
cases involved an attorney's relationship with a labor union whereby personal
injury cases were solicited for the attorney. In the former case the attorney

was reprimanded; in the latter the attorney was suspended.

90. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1118, 1119 (1964).

91. Id. at 1116, 1117.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
I re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
In re Brotherhood of R.. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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the Brotherhood's legal aid plan, and with an eye on the various
inroads made in recent years on the strict rules against solicitation, this writer has been led to the inexorable conclusion that
the Supreme Court's decision would have been exactly the
same if the financial arrangements used in the past had been in
issue. There can be no doubt but that they were in issue in Virginia's courts, but not on appeal. Further, this writer believes
that the only consideration that would have caused the Court
to deny the Brotherhood protection under the First Amendment
would have been a definite and immediately ascertainable public
danger: even more substantial than what could result from
solicitation of this character.
Undoubtedly this case will serve as a legal blueprint for
other unions and similar organizations and associations.
RICHARD G. LAWRENCE

96. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1116 n. 9 (1964).
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